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E-commerce platforms provide their customers with ranked lists
of recommended items matching the customers’ preferences. Mer-
chants on e-commerce platforms would like their items to appear as
high as possible in the top-N of these ranked lists. In this paper, we
demonstrate how unscrupulous merchants can create item images
that artificially promote their products, improving their rankings.
Recommender systems that use images to address the cold start
problem are vulnerable to this security risk. We describe a new type
of attack, Adversarial Item Promotion (AIP), that strikes directly at
the core of Top-N recommenders: the ranking mechanism itself.
Existing work on adversarial images in recommender systems in-
vestigates the implications of conventional attacks, which target
deep learning classifiers. In contrast, our AIP attacks are embedding
attacks that seek to push features representations in a way that
fools the ranker (not a classifier) and directly leads to item promo-
tion. We introduce three AIP attacks insider attack, expert attack,
and semantic attack, which are defined with respect to three succes-
sively more realistic attack models. Our experiments evaluate the
danger of these attacks when mounted against three representative
visually-aware recommender algorithms in a framework that uses
images to address cold start. We also evaluate potential defenses,
including adversarial training and find that common, currently-
existing, techniques do not eliminate the danger of AIP attacks.
In sum, we show that using images to address cold start opens
recommender systems to potential threats with clear practical im-
plications.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Visually-aware recommender systems [20, 24, 32] incorporate im-
age information into their ranking mechanism. This information
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Figure 1: The cooperative cold item image and its corre-
sponding adversarial cold item image (top) are each in-
jected into the candidate set, which is generated by a first-
stage ranker (here, BPR). In the personalized ranked list
generated by the visually-aware second-stage ranker (here,
DVBPR) the advesarial item (right) lands much higher than
the cooperative item (left). (Diagram shows a real example.
The adversarial item image is generated by our INSA attack
with ϵ = 32 and epoch = 5 explained in detail in Section 4.1).
helps to address the challenge of cold start since it compensates for
insufficient interactions associated with new users or items. In this
paper, we show how the use of image content for cold start opens
visually-aware recommenders to vulnerability.1
The vulnerability is due to adversarial examples, which are sam-
ples deliberately designed to cause a machine learning system to
1Code available at: https://github.com/liuzrcc/AIP
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make mistakes. The computer vision community has developed an
in-depth understanding of how adversarial images can be used to
attack classifiers, starting with [3, 41]. Classifier-targeted adver-
sarial images can have an impact on recommender systems that
leverage image content, as has been demonstrated by TAaMR [13].
However, until now, recommender system researchers have not
considered how images can be modified to create adversarial items
that attack visually-aware Top-N recommender systems by directly
targeting the ranker, rather than a classifier.
We expose the vulnerability of visually-aware recommender sys-
tems to adversarial items by presenting a series of attacks and by
experimentally assessing the threat that they pose. We also exam-
ine possible defenses. Adversarial training has been proposed in
order to improve the general performance of multimedia recom-
mender systems. The dominant approach is currently AMR [42].
Our experiments show that AMR is not sufficient to defend against
our adversarial attacks. Further, other common defenses, such as
image compression also fall short. In sum, the vulnerabilities of
visually-aware recommender systems that we investigate here are
serious and require further attention of the research community.
Our work is part of the long tradition of research devoted to the
security and robustness of recommender system algorithms [5, 9, 15,
16, 27, 29, 33, 35, 43]. Most work, however, focuses on vulnerabilities
related to user profiles. Early work looked at shilling [27], which
uses fake users. Shilling was later generalized to profile injection
attacks [33] or poisoning attack [29]. In our work, in contrast, we
are looking at attackers who are able to manipulate items directly,
and, specifically, to choose item images. In other words, instead of
looking at profile-related attacks we are looking at an item represen-
tation attacks. Concretely, the risk of such attacks presents itself in
the case of e-commerce platforms that sell the items of individual
merchants, e.g., e-commerce or customer to customer (C2C) market-
places. The merchants create their own item description, including
images. We show that if such merchants act unscrupulously they
can artificially promote their items and compromise the security of
the recommender system.
Figure 1 illustrates the mechanics of the attack that we consider
in this paper, called an Adversarial Item Promotion (AIP) attack.
On the left, we see personalized item ranking for a user when the
recommender system is not under attack (i.e., the cold start item is
a “cooperative item”). On the right, we see the ranking when the
recommender system is under attack by an unscrupulous merchant,
who has used a manipulated image in an item representation (i.e.,
the cold start item is an “adversarial item”). This setup reflects the
way that recommender system platformwould add a certain number
of cold items to the personalized ranked lists of users in order to
allow the items to start accumulating interactions. We choose a
two-stage recommender, since they are used in industry [11, 45].
With the two stage recommender, we ensure that the adversarial
cold item is competing against selected candidate items that are
already very relevant to the user.
We provide a short walk-through of Figure 1, which illustrates
the attack at the level of a single cold item and a single user. A set of
“candidate items for ranking” for that user has been selected using
a conventional personalized Top-N recommender. Then the cold
item is injected into that set. Finally, a visually-aware personalized
Top-N recommender is used to rank the candidate item set before it
is presented to the user. We see that in the case of the cooperative
image (left), the cold item lands somewhere in the ranked list, but
probably not at the top. In contrast, in the case of the adversarial
image (right), the cold item lands at the top of the personalized
item ranking.
The overall impact of the attack depends on the accumulated
effect of the attack over all users, and not just a single instance of
the attack shown in Figure 1. It is important to understand that the
final rank position of the cooperative vs. adversarial item will be
different for each instance of the attack. However, in general, if the
adversarial item of an unscrupulous merchant lands consistently
farther towards the top of users’ personalized recommendation lists
than it deserves to, then, at large scale, the merchant will accrue
considerable benefit.
We choose to focus on the cold-start problem because of its
importance for recommender systems. However, there is also an-
other reason. A straightforward, practical approach to blocking
adversarial image promotion attacks on non-cold-start items is to
prevent merchants from being able to change images once their
items have started to accumulate interactions. Cold start is the most
important moment of opportunity for a merchant to introduce an
adversarial image into a representation. Every item starts in some
way cold, and the issue particularly extreme in C2C marketplaces
selling many unique items.
With this paper, we make the following contributions:
• We propose three Adversarial Item Promotion (AIP) attacks
on the ranking mechanism of visually-aware recommender
systems in a cold item scenario and experimentally assess
their impact. The attacks correspond to three different levels
of knowledge and we test them using two real-world data
sets.
• We show that there is no easy defense against AIP attacks.
The currently dominant adversarial training, as well as con-
ventional defenses such as compression, are not sufficient to
eliminate the vulnerability.
• We release an implementation of our attacks and defenses
that allows for testing and extension.
This paper follows the standard procedure for security research.
First, we specify a framework including the types of attacks ex-
pected (attack models), the systems to be attacked, and a means
of measuring the impact of the attacks. Then, we propose attacks
for each attack model and evaluate their success. The systems that
we attack are representative of visually-aware recommender sys-
tems, i.e., a visual feature-based similarity model (AlexRank) based
on AlexNet [25], a Collaborative-Filtering (CF) model leveraging
visual features (VBPR [20]), and state-of-the-art learning-based neu-
ral model (DVPBR [24]). Finally, we turn to the analysis of possible
defenses and close with a conclusion and outlook.
2 RELATEDWORK
2.1 Robustness of Recommender System
In this section, we review previous work on recommender robust-
ness. Note that this work focused on user profiles, not image con-
tent. O’Mahony et al. [35] introduce the definition of recommender
system robustness and present several attacks to identify character-
istics that influence robustness. Lam and Riedl [27] explore shilling
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attacks in recommender systems by evaluating recommendation
performance under different scenarios. In particular, they find that
new or obscure items are more especially susceptible to attack,
and they suggest that obtaining ratings from a trusted source for
these items could make them less vulnerable. Mobasher et al. [33]
propose a formal framework to characterize different recommender
system attacks, and they also propose an approach to detect attack
profiles. In [33] and [5], evaluation metrics, e.g., hit rate for item
and prediction shift, for the robustness of recommender systems are
discussed. Recently, instead of model-agnostic profile injection at-
tacks, poisoning attacks that leverage exact recommendation model
information have been proposed. Li et al. [29] propose poisoning
attacks on factorization-based CF algorithms that approximate the
gradient based on first-order KKT conditions. Christakopoulou and
Banerjee [9] propose a generative approach to generate fake user
profiles to mount profile injection attacks. Fang et al. propose poi-
soning attacks to graph-based recommender systems [16]. They
also propose to generate fake user-item interactions based on influ-
ence function [15]. Tang et al. [43] propose effective transfer-based
poisoning attacks against recommender systems, but they mention
that their approach is less effective on cold items. Our “item rep-
resentation attack” is distinct from a “profile injection attack” or
“poisoning attack”, but both kinds of attacks have similar impacts,
namely, pushing items that have been targeted for promotion.
2.2 Visually-aware Recommender System
Visually-aware recommender systems incorporate visual informa-
tion into their recommendation ranking mechanism. Originally,
visually-aware recommenders relied on image content retrieval to
make preference predictions. Given a query image, Kalantidis et
al. [23] gather segmentation parts and retrieve visually similar items
within each of the predicted classes. Later, semantic information
of images is also incorporated to improve retrieval performance.
Jagadeesh et al. [21] collect a large-scale dataset, Fashion-136K,
with detailed annotations and propose several retrieval-based ap-
proaches to recommend a matching item based on the query image.
Beyond image retrieval-based recommendation approaches, user-
item interactions are leveraged in visually-aware recommenders.
IBR [32] models human notions of similarity by considering alter-
native or complementary items. Algorithms also incorporate the
visual signal into CF models so as to exploit user feedback and vi-
sual features simultaneously, e.g., VBPR [20] and Fashion DNA [4].
Recently, with the advances in computational resources, learning-
based neural frameworks have been proposed and achieve state of
the art performance on fashion recommendation (DVBPR [24]) and
reciprocal recommendations (ImRec [34]). In our paper, to compre-
hensively evaluate AIP attacks in different recommenders, we select
three representatives: an image-retrieval-based similarity model, a
CF model leveraging visual features and a learning-based neural
model.
2.3 Adversarial Machine Learning
Adversarial examples are data samples that are deliberately de-
signed in order to mislead machine learning algorithms [3, 41]. A
limited amount of work, as mentioned above, has addressed adver-
sarial images for recommender systems. The work most closely
related to our own [13] looks only at classification-based issues.
Di Noia et al. [13] propose Targeted Adversarial Attack against
Multimedia Recommender Systems (TAaMR), and they use two
classification-based adversarial attacks, namely Fast Gradient Sign
Method (FGSM) [41] and Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [26],
to evaluate two visually-aware recommender systems. In contrast
to [13], we show that the problem of adversarial examples in rec-
ommender system goes beyond the problem of classifier-targeted
adversarial examples.
Adversarial training is a promising techniques to tackle adver-
sarial examples [31]. As stated in Section 1, research on adversarial
training in visually-aware recommnder systems has, until this point,
focused on improving general performance. Specifically, AMR [42]
aims to improve recommendation with adversarial training (cf. Sec-
tion 7.1 for details) and considers the robustness of recommender
systems perturbations in system-internal representations. In con-
trast, our goal is to investigate security vulnerability originating
from an external adversary who attacks item images. We show
that simple adversarial training (i.e., AMR) is not a guarantee for
robustness against AIP attacks (cf. Section 7.1).
3 BACKGROUND AND FRAMEWORK
This section introduces the background and framework in which
the attack models are developed and evaluated. Figure 2 gives the
overview of the setup. As introduced in Section 1, we use a two-
stage approach. The first-stage recommender generates a personal-
ized set of candidate items. For this purpose, we choose Bayesian
Personalized Ranking (BPR) [38], a representative CF model that is
trained on the user-item interaction data. We use the visually-aware
second-stage recommender to make a comparison between the cold
start of a cooperative item and an adversarial item.
In this section, we first present our three attack models (Sec-
tion 3.1), which are the basis for three specific AIP attacks, INSA,
EXPA, and SEMA, explained in Section 4. Then, we present the
three representative visually-aware recommenders that we attack
(Section 3.2). Finally, we explain the dimensions along which we
evaluate the impact of the attacks (Section 3.3).
Table 1: The three AIP attack models characterized by the
knowledge to which the attacker has access for each.
Attack model General Knowledge Visual feature
extraction model Embeddings
High knowledge
cf. INSA (Section 4.1) ×
Medium knowledge
cf. EXPA (Section 4.2) × ×
Low knowledge
cf. SEMA (Section 4.3) ×
3.1 Attack Models
We define three attack model following the three dimensions rel-
evant for trustworthy recommender systems [33]. The Intent di-
mension captures the objective of the attacker. All our models use
‘push’ intent, i.e., attackers are merchants who want their items
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Figure 2: Setup for attack and attack evaluation.
promoted to higher ranks in users’ personalized recommendation
lists. The Knowledge dimension captures how much information
that the attacker has about the system being attacked. Defining
knowledge levels is common in adversarial machine learning re-
search [3, 7]. Our three attack models correspond to three different
levels of knowledge: high, medium, and low. The Scale dimension
captures the scope of the interference. In all our attack models, we
assume an attack with minimum scale, e.g., only a single item is
attacked at any given moment. Such a small-scale attack is least
likely to be noticed. It is clear that the harm caused by the attack
will increase with scale.
Table 1 summarizes our attack models in terms of the level of
knowledge involved. For our high-knowledge attack model we
assume that the attacker is an insider at the recommender system
platform and has access to the user embeddings of the trained
recommender model. This scenario is not particularly realistic, but
it is important because it demonstrates an upper bound for the
potential damage that can be inflicted by an AIP attack.
The medium- and low-knowledge attack models are more real-
istic and assume that the attacker has general knowledge of the
market in which the recommender system operates. In particular,
the attacker must be able to identify (by observing sales trends or
advertising) at least one item that sells well on the platform. We re-
fer to this item as a hook item. The attack is strongest when the hook
item image is an image used by the recommender, but it could also
be an image of the item acquired elsewhere. As will be explained
in Section 4, the adversarial item will use the hook item to pull
itself up in the ranked list. In the medium-knowledge attack model,
in addition to general knowledge, the attacker must have access
to the pre-trained visual feature extractor used by the visually-
aware recommender systems. Recommender systems leveraging a
pre-trained visual feature extractor are prevalent in both academic
research and industry, e.g., [17, 20, 28, 32, 37, 40]. These models are
often released as publicly available resources in transfer learning.
3.2 Visually-aware Recommender Systems
In this section, we introduce the three representative visually-aware
recommender systems that we will attack in our experiments: the
visual feature-based similarity model (AlexRank), the CF model
leveraging visual features (VBPR) and the learning-based neural
approach (DVBPR). We chose these recommenders because they
represent the three types of commonly used visually-aware recom-
mender systems.
3.2.1 AlexRank. Image-content-retrieval-based recommendation
is a nearest neighbor approach that ranks items by visual feature
similarity of product images. Such methods are commonly used
as baseline approaches in visually-aware recommender system
research [24]. Here we use the output of the second fully-connected
layer of AlexNet [25] as the visual feature of item images. Given an
image of item i , the average Euclidean distance between the visual
feature of item i and all items that user u has interacted with is
calculated, so smaller distance means higher preference prediction.




−∥Φf (Xi ) − Φf (Xj )∥2
|I+u |
, (1)
where I+u is the set of items that user u has interacted with, and
Xi ,Xj represent images of item i and j. Φf is the pre-trained model
for image feature extraction. Note that the final ranking of item i
for user u is solely determined by preference score pu,i .
3.2.2 VBPR. Extended from BPR [38], VBPR [20] incorporates
visual features into the CF model. By leveraging image features
of pre-trained CNN models, VBPR improves the recommendation
performance of BPR. The preference prediction of VBPR is described
in Equation 2:
pu,i = α + βu + βi + γ
T
u γi + θ
T
u (EΦf (Xi )), (2)
where θu is the user content embedding, and E is the parameter for
the visual feature. Φf (Xi ) represents the visual feature of item Xi
from pre-trained model Φf , and α , βu and βi are user, item biases
and global offset term. γu and γi represent the latent interaction-
based embeddings for user and item. For model learning, VBPR
adopts the pairwise ranking optimization framework from BPR.
The training triples set Ds is described in Equation 3:
Ds = {(u, i, j)|u ∈ U ∧ i ∈ I
+
u ∧ j ∈ I/I
+
u } (3)
whereU and I represent the user and item sets, i represents the
interacted item, and j represents the non-interacted item. A boot-
strap sampling of training triples is used for model training. The





− lnσ (pu,i − pu, j ) + λΘ | |Θ| |2 (4)
where Θ represents all model parameters and λΘ is the weight of
regularization term.
3.2.3 DVBPR. DVBPR [24] is a concise end-to-end model whose
visual feature extractor is trained directly in a pair-wise manner.
DVBPR achieves the state-of-the-art performance on several data
sets for visually-aware recommendations [24]. The preference pre-
diction of DVBPR is described in Equation 5:
pu,i = θ
T
u Φe (Xi ), (5)
where θu is the user content embedding, and Φe (Xi ) is the item
content embedding where the CNN model Φe is trained directly in
a pair-wise manner.
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3.3 Attack Evaluation Dimensions
We evaluate attacks according to the aspects of integrity and avail-
ability distinguished in machine learning security [1]. Our main
concern is the ability of the attack to compromise the integrity of
the recommender system, which is related to the success of the
‘push’ intent of our attack models (cf. Section 3.1). We measure the
ability of our attacks to raise the rank of cold-start items such that
adversarial cold start items land higher than the corresponding
cooperative cold start items in users’ personalized recommenda-
tion lists. Specifically, we report the change in rank of cold-start
items with prediction shift and change in hit rate (cf. Section 5.2).
In addition, we measure availability, which is related to whether
the recommender system remains useful to other merchants and to
customers while under attack. For this purpose, we use ‘ordinary’
test items. (We adopt the test items defined by the data sets.) We
calculate change in hit rate when a ordinary test item is in a candi-
date set with a cooperative cold item and when the same ordinary
test item is in a candidate set with an adversarial cold item.
We also consider the extent to which the attack is noticeable
to the human eye. As attacks increase in strength, perturbations
become visible in images and adversarial images can be identified
by experts who know what they were looking for. However, e-
commerce platforms are so large and the turnover of items so fast
that it is impossible to manually vet all of the images represent-
ing items, cf. the known difficulty of filtering item collections for
banned or unsafe products [2]. For these reason, strong attacks
(i.e., larger image perturbations) are quite realistic. By focusing our
experiments on strong attacks, we can evaluate the extent of the vul-
nerability of the system. We also carry out additional experiments
that demonstrate the effect of an attack increasing in strength from
weak to strong. In this way, we shed light on what might happen if
user clicks are affected by an impression of low quality due to the
presence of perturbations in images. Our additional experiments
show that the success of the attack is not dependent on a highly
noticeable change to the image appearance.
4 ADVERSARIAL ITEM PROMOTION
ATTACKS
In this section, we introduce three adversarial item promotion (AIP)
attacks corresponding to the three attack models previously intro-
duced (cf. Section 3.1).
4.1 Insider Attack (INSA)
The high-knowledge attack model assumes the attacker has insider
access to the user embeddings of the trained model (see Section 3.1).
Some visually-aware recommenders (e.g., AlexRank) only use visual
embedding (feature) to build nearest neighbor-based recommender,
and other recommenders (e.g., DVBPR) model the visual content
embedding together with user content embedding using dot prod-
uct in a CF manner (cf. Section 3.2). For instance, in DVBPR, the
inner product of user embedding θu and item embedding Φe (Xi )
represents the preference of user u on item i .
We propose an insider attack (INSA) in which the attacker can
modify the embeddings of item images in order to increase the
predicted preference score that solely determines the recommen-
dation ranking. Specifically, INSA changes item embeddings by
adding perturbations δ on the item images. The perturbations are
optimized iteratively such that the strength of preference for the
item is maximized over all user profiles. In this paper, the magni-
tude of δ is restricted by L∞ norm, which represents the maximum
value of δ and is commonly used in computer vision research to
measure imperceptibility [7, 41]. Formally, given a product image
Xi of item i , we optimize perturbations δ to increase the preference
pu,i of all users on item i . The optimization objectives for different


















exp (θTu Φe (Xi + δ))
(6)
Φ : Xi → θi is the feature extraction or embedding model where
θi represents the content embedding for item i . θu represents the
user content embedding. The optimization can be implemented by
mini-batch gradient descent, and it stops when certain conditions
are met, e.g., it reaches certain number of iterations.
4.2 Expert Attack (EXPA)
The medium-knowledge attack model assumes that the attacker can
select a hook (i.e., popular) item. It also assumes that the attacker
has access to the visual feature extraction model (see Section 3.1)
and has the expertise needed to use it in a transfer learning pipeline.
We propose an expert attack (EXPA) in which the attacker uses the
hook item to mark the region of item space to which the adversarial
item should be moved. Specifically, the EXPA attack generates
perturbations added to the cooperative item in order to create the
adversarial item by decreasing the representation distance to the
hook item.
Formally, generating an adversarial item image by EXPA is de-
scribed in Equation 7:
argmin
δ
∥Φ(Xi + δ) − Φ(Xhook)∥2, (7)
where Φ is the feature extraction or embedding model. The EXPA
attack leverages the same mechanism as the targeted visual feature
attack proposed by [39]. The novelty of EXPA is its use of a hook
image that moves the adversarial image in image space in a way
that makes it rise in personalized recommendation lists. Note that
the hook image itself is not necessarily present in candidate set,
which is selected by BPR, and thereby also not necessarily in the
recommendation lists.
Algorithm 1 describes the process to generate adversarial prod-
uct images with INSA and EXPA. Xi is the original image of cold
item, and Xhook is the hook item. Φ is the neural network that ex-
tracts embeddings or features from the image content. Our aim is to
find perturbations δ that could increase the personalized preference
predictions by optimization through all user content embeddings
(INSA) or targeting a hook item (EXPA). The magnitude of pertur-
bations can be adjusted by δ . To make sure that the output images
are valid with respect to standard image encoding format, a clip
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Algorithm 1 Adversarial Item Promotion Attack
Input:
X: cold item image, Xhook: hook item image
δ : adversarial perturbations, ϵ : L∞ norm bound
Φ: neural network, θ : user content embedding
K : number of iterations, A: attack to mount (INSA or EXPA)
Output:
X
′ : adversarial product image
1: Initialize x ′0 ← X, ▷ x
′
k represents adversarial image in
iteration k
2: δ ← 0
3: for k ← 1 to K do
4: if A is INSA then












7: VBPR: δ ← argmax
δ
∑
u∈U θTu (EΦf (x
′
k−1 + δ ))
8:
9: DVBPR: δ ← argmax
δ
∑
u∈U exp (θTu Φe (x ′k−1 + δ )) ▷ Eq.(6)
10: else if A is EXPA then
11: δ ← argmin
δ




15: δ ← clip(δ, −ϵ, ϵ ) ▷ Make sure that the magnitude of
perturbations are in pre-defined L∞
norm range
16: x ′k ← x
′
k−1 + δ
17: x ′k ← clip(x
′
k + δ, 0, 1) ▷ Ensure perturbed image stays in
valid image range
18: end for
19: x ′k ← quantize(x
′
k ) ▷ Ensure x
′




← x ′k is the adversarial item image
function restricts adversarial item image in range [0, 1], and a quan-
tization function ensures that the output image can be saved in the
8-bit format. The resulting adversarial image X
′
is the summation
of the original image and the clipped perturbations.
4.3 Semantic Attack (SEMA)
The low-knowledge attack model assume nothing beyond general
knowledge needed to choose hook items (see Section 3.1). We pro-
pose a semantic attack (SEMA) uses the semantic content of the
image, i.e., what is shown in the image, in order to achieve the
promotion of items. The attack differs considerably from INSA
and EXPA, which add perturbations to existing images without
changing what the images depict.
Figure 3 c-SEMA illustrates the semantic attack that we will
test here, which we call compositing semantic attack (c-SEMA).
With c-SEMA, the attacker creates an adversarial image by editing
the original image into the hook item image as an inset. Here, the
c-SEMA attack is promoting a pair of shoes and the hook item is
the jeans. A text (here, “match your jeans/coat”) can be included to
contribute to the impression that the composite image is a fair-play
attempt to raise the interest of potential customers.
Table 2: Statistics of the data sets
#Users #Items #Interactions
Amazon Men 34244 110636 254870
Tradesy.com 33864 326393 655409
Figure 3 n-SEMA shows another type of semantic attack, which
we call natural semantic attack (n-SEMA). Here, the integration of
the hook item is natural. n-SEMA images can be created in a photo
studio or a professional photo editor. We do not test them here,
since creation is time consuming and we are using a cold test set
of 1000 item images. However, an unscrupulous merchant would
have the incentive to invest the time to create n-SEMA images.
One highly successful adversarial item image could already lead to
increased buyers and increased profit.
The semantic attack is particularly interesting for two reasons.
SEMA achieves the change in image embeddings needed to push an
adversarial image close to a hook image in image space by manipu-
lating the depicted content of the image. First, this means that there
are no limits on the quality of a SEMA adversarial image. Contrast
c-SEMA and n-SEMA with the INSA and EXPA photos in Figure 3.
The item is visible in the image, and consumers who decide to pur-
chase the product will not find that they have beenmisled. However,
not all of the images are crisp, and stronger attacks introduce arti-
facts affecting the perceived image quality. Second, the impact of
a SEMA image attack is not dependent on the algorithm used by
the recommender systems. In fact, SEMA images can effectively
attack any recommender system using visual features, and not just
systems using neural embedding as studied here.
5 EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
In this section, we first introduce data sets used for our experi-
ments (Section 5.1) and introduce the details of evaluation setup
including metrics (Section 5.2). Then, we describe implementation
of experiments (Section 5.3).
5.1 Data
5.1.1 Data statistics. We perform our experiments on two data
sets: Men’s Clothing in Amazon.com and Tradesy.com, which are
publicly available and widely used in visually-aware recommender
system research. The statistics of the two data sets are described
in Table 2. The Men’s Clothing category is an important subset of
the Amazon.com data set, where the effectiveness of visual features
has been validated in previous work [20, 24, 32]. Tradesy.com is a
C2C second-hand clothing trading website where users can buy
and sell fashion items. The nature of the Tradesy.com inventory
makes visually-aware cold item recommendation crucial, because
of its “one-off” characteristics. For both datasets, one descriptive
image is available for each item, and we follow the protocol of [24]
and treat users’ review histories as implicit feedback. For each user,
one item is selected among all interacted items as the test item, so
we have the same number of test items as the number of users.
5.1.2 Cold test item election. To validate the effectiveness of the at-
tacks in cold start scenario, in each of AmazonMen and Tradesy.com
data sets, we randomly select 1000 cold test items that no user has
interacted with and leave them out as the cold test set. These cold
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INSA EXPA





Figure 3: Examples of adversarial item images by different approaches. INSA attack is based on Equation 6. EXPA, c-SEMA
and n-SEMA select a popular item, e.g., Levi’s 501 jeans, as the hook item. c-SEMA applies simple co-depiction approach,
and n-SEMA incorporates the target item in a more natural way. More details about the influence of ϵ on recommendation
performance can be found in Section 6.2
items are excluded from the training process. Later, they are in-
jected as cold-start items into the candidate item set before feeding
the set into the visually-aware ranker.
5.2 Evaluation Metrics
The change in rank of cold-start items is measured by the prediction
shift and the change in hit rate (HR@N ), following the evaluation
metrics for top-N recommender system robustness [33] and [5].
Equation 8 defines the average prediction shift ∆pi for item i and
also the mean average prediction shift for a set of test items ∆set.
Our results will report |∆set | and the direction separately for clar-
ity. p′u,i is the post-attack predictor score and pu,i is the original












Equation 9 defines the average hit rate HRi@N for item i in terms
of Hu,i@N for item i for user u. The mean average hit rate HR@N
for test items averages HRi@N over the test set. ∆HR@N is the
change in mean average hit rate, where HR
′
i@N is the post-attack




















It is important to note that low metric values can still result in large
impact due to the large number of users involved. For example, in
Amazon Men, an increase of 0.01 on HR@5 means that adversarial
cold items are pushed into the top-5 list of about 340 users.
5.3 Implementation
In the first stage, we use BPR to generate a candidate set of top 1000
items that are selected by personalized preference ranking. Note
that we use a set, which means that the original rank order is not
taken into account by the visually-aware ranker. Then we inject
the ordinary test item in the top 1000 candidate set and get a set of
1001 items for each user. To compare before and after the attack, we
inject one cooperative cold item or its corresponding adversarial
cold item in the candidate set. So, for each cold-start item, we have
two sets of 1002 items, which each include one test item and also
include either one cooperative or one adversarial cold item. We use
our three visual ranking models, AlexRank, VBPR, and DVBPR (see
Section 3.2), to rank the 1002 items and evaluate with respect to
both integrity and availability (see Section 3.3).
5.3.1 Model training. We implement BPR, AlexRank, VBPR, and
DVBPR in PyTorch [36]. For the first stage model BPR, we set the
number of factors to 64. Stochastic Gradient Desecent (SGD) is
used to optimize BPR with learning rate 0.01 for Amazon Men and
0.5 for Tradesy.com, where the weight decay for L2 penalty is set
to 0.001 on both data sets. The feature dimension of AlexRank is
2048, and the embedding length of both VBPR and DVBPR is 100.
A grid search of learning rate in {0.1, 0.01, 0.001, 0.005} and weight
decay in {0.001, 0.0001, 0.0001} is conducted for both VBPR and
DVBPR to select hyperparameters, and we select the model with
best validation performance.
5.3.2 AIP attacks. If not specifically mentioned, the maximal size
of perturbations ϵ for AIP attacks is set to 32. In INSA, the number
of epochs is set to 10 to control the attacking time, and our imple-
mentation takes about 2 hours to generate 1000 adversarial item
images on a single NVIDIA RTX 2080Ti GPU. We use the Adam
optimizer with the learning rate of 0.001 for DVBPR and 0.0001
for both VBPR and AlexRank. In EXPA, the hook items are “Levi’s
Men’s 501 Original Fit Jean” in Amazon Men and a gray coat in
Tradesy.com. These two products are most commonly interacted
items in training data of these two data sets. Recall, however, that
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hooks can be chosen without direct access to interaction statistics.
We use a Adam optimizer with a learning rate of 0.01 in EXPA, and
the number of iterations is set as 5000. In c-SEMA, we resize the
hook item image and paste it on the right side of the cooperative
item image as shown in Figure 3. To make the combination more
natural, we also add a text description. More implementation details
can be found in our released code.
6 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we carry out experimental analysis of our attacks
using two real-world data sets (Section 6.1) and also investigate the
influence of hyperparameter selections (Section 6.2). Finally, we
analyze and discuss classification-based attack (Section 6.3).
6.1 Attack Evaluation
Table 3: Absolutemean average prediction shifts of adversar-
ial cold items |∆set | on Amazon Men (AM) and Tradesy.com
(TC), where ↑ represents positive prediction shift (score in-
creased) and ↓ represents negative prediction shift (score de-
creased). Positive shift means a successful attack.
AlexRank VBPR DVBPR
INSA EXPA c-SEMA INSA EXPA c-SEMA INSA EXPA c-SEMA
AM ↑16.13 ↑15.94 ↑11.1 ↑3.27 ↑3.16 ↑0.88 ↑13.54 ↑4.80 ↑4.82
TC ↑26.89 ↓0.67 ↓3.44 ↓0.79 ↑1.60 ↑1.45 ↑3.64 ↑1.89 ↑1.19
We mount AIP attacks and assess their effects with respect to our
metrics (cf. Section 5.1.2). Table 3 shows the absolute mean average
prediction shift |∆set | for adversarial cold items vs. cooperative
items. The upwards arrow represents a positive prediction shift,
meaning that the attack has successfully promoted the item. We see
that for nearly all combinations of AIP attack and visually-aware
recommender system the attack is successful. The high-knowledge
attack, INSA, achieves a larger shift than EXPA and c-SEMA. c-
SEMA is surprisingly successful, given the very minimal amount
of knowledge that it requires. Note that it is only meaningful to
compare the size of the prediction shift for the same recommender
system and the same data set. A negative mean average prediction
shift does not necessarily mean that an attack is unsuccessful since
it is the rank position and not the preference prediction score that
translates into benefit for the attacker. For this reason, we go on to
examine hit rate related metrics.
Table 4(a) presents results in terms of the mean average hit rate
HR@5. The first two rows report the original situation: the hit
rate for the cooperative (i.e., not adversarial) version of the cold
items and the hit rate for the ordinary test items in the case that
no adversarial items have been added to the candidate set. The rest
of the table reports on attacks. Cases marked with ∗∗ indicate a
statistically significant difference between the original situation
and the case of the attack (item-level paired sample t-test p < 0.01).
First, we consider “Integrity”, namely, the success of the attacks
in pushing items. It can be observed in Table 4 that in nearly all cases
the hit rate for the adversarial version of the cold items exceeds
that of the cooperative version of the cold items, meaning that all
AIP attacks are generally effective. For INSA, the impact of the
attack is dramatic. The cooperative cold item makes it to one of the
top-5 position in the lists of only 35 users (averaged over the three
recommender system), but after the attack, the adversarial cold item
makes it into the top-5 position of over 20,000 users. Since INSA
uses the most knowledge, it is not surprising that it is the most
effective attack. However, even with much less knowledge, both
EXPA and c-SEMA pose serious threats. For example, for Amazon
Men, c-SEMA pushes cold items into the top-5 list of 582 users
in the case of DVBPR. We also calculated HR@10 and HR@20 for
all conditions. These are not reported here since the trends were
overwhelming the same as for HR@5.
Next, we turn to discuss “Availability”, namely, the extent to
which promotion occurs at the expense of other items, which at
scale can impede the functioning of the entire recommender system.
In Table 4, we see that INSA has a strong impact on availability
than EXPA and c-SEMA.
Notice that the different performance of EXPA and c-SEMA on
Amazon Men and Tradesy.com is not solely attributable to the
adversarial attack itself, since the selection of the hook item also
has an impact. For Tradesy.com, the HR@5 for the selected hook
item (which is a gray coat) is originally rather low, so after EXPA
or c-SEMA, the rank cannot increase dramatically. In general, we
observe that AIP attacks are more damaging to integrity than to
availability. However, in real-world situations it would be important
to study cases involving the simultaneous presence of multiple
adversarial items.
In order to directly illustrate the magnitude of the impact of
AIP attacks on integrity, we report the change in mean average hit
rate |∆HR@5 | in Table 5(a). Again, the expected large effect of INSA
can be observed. Also, again, the c-SEMA attack is surprisingly
effective, given the minimal knowledge it involves. Remember that
the recommender system platforms we are concerned about are
enormous, and even a small boost in average rank of the magni-
tude of that afforded by c-SEMA could translate in to a substantial
increase in interactions and profit.
Figure 4 shows a 2-D visualization (using t-SNE [30]) of the
image space defined by the DVBPR item embeddings. It allows
us to directly observe the influences of different AIP attacks. The
position of the original cold image (i.e., a cooperative image) is
shown by 1○. We can see that it is positioned next to items with
which it is visually similar. The attacks move this image to the other
positions. The hook item is a pair of jeans. We can see that EXPA,
c-SEMA, and n-SEMA push the cold item to a cluster related to
the hook item. Note that it is difficult to reason about the position
of INSA, since it is optimized with respect to all user embeddings.
Here the n-SEMA image is manually generated using photo-editing
software, in particular, after cropping and rotation, the shoes to be
promoted are edited into the hook image. However, recall that in
the real world an image could easily be taken of a model wearing
both items.
6.2 Influence of Hyperparameters
Choice of the hyperparameters can influence the impact of the
attack. Here, we take a look at the two most important hyperpa-
rameters, embedding length and attack strength (ϵ).
To study the impact of embedding length, we gradually reduce
the embedding length and measure HR@5. Specifically, we con-
duct experiments for different numbers of factors (for VBPR in
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Table 4: Average HR@5 of cooperative (adversarial) cold item and ordinary test item in AlexRank, VBPR, DVBPR and adver-
sarial training-based AMR. Three attacks, INSA, EXPA, and c-SEMA, are evaluated on AmazonMen and Tradesy.com data sets.
∗∗ indicates that the increase/decrease over ordinary test/cooperative cold test are statistically significant (p < 0.01).
(a) AlexRank, VBPR, and DVBPR.
Amazon Men Tradesy.com
Attack method Dimension Test set AlexRank VBPR DVBPR AlexRank VBPR DVBPR
−
− Cooperative cold test 0.0011 0.0017 0.0010 0.0003 0.0022 0.0011
− Ordinary test 0.0187 0.0191 0.0195 0.0338 0.0241 0.0234
INSA Integrity Adversarial cold test 0.8296
∗∗ 0.2678∗∗ 0.7211∗∗ 0.9399∗∗ 0.0783∗∗ 0.2711∗∗
Availability Ordinary test 0.0140∗∗ 0.0190∗∗ 0.0170∗∗ 0.0284∗∗ 0.0224∗∗ 0.0228∗∗
EXPA Integrity Adversarial cold test 0.0036
∗∗ 0.0150∗∗ 0.0646∗∗ 0.0002∗∗ 0.0048∗∗ 0.0384∗∗
Availability Ordinary test 0.0188∗∗ 0.0198∗∗ 0.0192∗∗ 0.0338 0.0228∗∗ 0.0232∗∗
c-SEMA Integrity Adversarial cold test 0.0017
∗∗ 0.0027∗∗ 0.0181∗∗ 0.0000∗∗ 0.0048∗∗ 0.0005∗∗












Table 5: |∆HR@5 | before and after AIP attacks: Cold items (attack is successful if HR@5 rises).
(a) AlexRank, VBPR, and DVBPR.
Amazon Men Tradesy.com
AlexRank VBPR DVBPR AlexRank VBPR DVBPR
INSA adversarial cold vs. cooperative cold ↑ 0.8285 ↑ 0.2661 ↑ 0.7201 ↑ 0.9396 ↑ 0.0761 ↑ 0.2700
EXPA adversarial cold vs. cooperative cold ↑ 0.0025 ↑ 0.0133 ↑ 0.0636 ↓ 0.0001 ↑ 0.0026 ↑ 0.0373




↑ 0.7463 ↑ 0.2845
↑ 0.0172 ↑ 0.0026
















Figure 4: 2-D visualization of item embedding by pre-trained DVBPRmodel (#factors = 100) for randomly selected 1000 items
in Amazon Men data set, cooperative item 1○ embedding and its corresponding adversarial item embedding. Attacks include
generated images by INSA 2○, EXPA 3○, c- SEMA 4○ and n- SEMA 5○.
{20, 50, 100} and for DVBPR in {10, 30, 50, 100}) with same adver-
sarial budget (i.e., same iterations and learning rates). Results are
presented in Figure 5 for VBPR and DVBPR. We discovered that
the embedding length is quite important, with evidence pointing
towards systems using shorter embedding length being more vul-
nerable to AIP attacks. This finding is valuable since without this
knowledge a visually-aware recommender systems might use short
embeddings to save storage.
To study the impact of attack strength we vary the magnitude
of ϵ and measure HR@5. We carry out experiments with ϵ in
{4, 8, 26, 32} for INSA and EXPA on subset of 100 cold item im-
ages. Results are presented in Table 6 for all three visually-aware
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Figure 5: HR@5 of cooperative cold items and adversarial
cold items by INSA/EXPA with different number of fac-
tors in VBPR and DVBPR on Amazon Men’s Clothing and
Tradesy.com data set.
recommender systems. We found that increasing ϵ from 4 to 32
leads to improved adversarial effects, but large perturbation size
is not necessary in most cases for a successful attack. Comparably,
DVBPR is more sensitive to the magnitude of ϵ than the other two
approaches. Recall that EXPA has sensitivities to the choice of the
hook item.
Figure 3 provides examples that correspond to different levels of
ϵ . This figure confirms that it is not necessary for the adversarial
modifications to be highly noticeable in an image in order for an
attack to be effective.
6.3 Classifier-targeted Adversarial Images
In Section 1, we pointed out that previous work on the vulnerability
of recommender systems that use images has focused on classifier-
targeted adversarial examples, which are already well studied in
the computer vision literature. In contrast, our EXPA and INSA
approaches target the ranking mechanism, and attack the user
content embedding. In this section, we confirm that our attack poses
a greater threat than the classifier-targeted attack TAaMR [13].
The TAaMR attack works by calculating the most popular class of
items using the data set on which the recommender system was
trained. As such, it can be considered an insider attack, which, like
our INSA, requires knowledge that would only be available inside
the company running the recommender system platform. TAaMR
also requires access to a visual feature extraction model, like our
EXPA. It uses this model as a source of class definitions and to
create images that are adversarial with respect to the most popular
class. For our experiments we create class-targeted adversarial
examples using two approaches from the computer vision literature,
FGSM [18] and PGD [26], on pre-trained AlexNet [25]. We use the
training data to calculate the most popular item classes. There
are ‘jersey, T-shirt, tee shirt’ (9468 interactions) for Amazon Men
and ‘suit, suit of clothes’ (19841 interactions) for Tradesy.com. The
inventory of classes is taken from ImageNet [12], as in [13]. Table 7
shows the change in mean average HR@5 for FGSM and PGD20
attack. Generally, PGD20 has larger impacts on the AlexRank, and
FGSM is more effective on VBPR. Both attacks have little impact on
DVBPR, because the architecture of AlexNet is fairly distinct from
the CNN-F architecture [8] in DVBPR. Although it uses information
comparable to that used by INSA and EXPA, the adversarial impact
is on par with the c-SEMA attack (cf. Table 5). This experiment
shows the importance of AIP attacks, which directly attacks the
user content embeddings and thereby the ranker.
7 DEFENSE
7.1 Adversarial Training
AMR (Adversarial Multimedia Recommendation) [42] uses the pref-
erence prediction function from VBPR (cf. Equation 2) and adds
on-the-fly adversarial information to the training process. Recall it
was proposed to improve recommendation performance, but here
we will study its potential for defending against AIP attacks. The
optimization of AMR is implemented by mini-batch gradient de-
scent. In each step, given a subset Da of Ds (cf. Equation 3), AMR





− lnσ (pu,i − pu, j ) (10)
In AMR, adversarial perturbations with respect to parameters are
calculated by model gradients and added to current parameters
in each step. Then it feeds forward the visual features, calculates
combined loss, and back-propagates to update the parameters of the
model. Specifically, p′u,i and p
′
u, j are calculated by the model with
perturbed parameters Θ′ (cf. Equation 2). Then, model parameters






− lnσ (pu,i−pu, j )−λadv lnσ (p′u,i−p
′
u, j )+λΘ | |Θ| |
2
(11)
where λadv is the weight hyperparameter for adversarial loss. To
train AMR, we adopt the same hyperparameters from VBPR and
set λadv = 1.
Table 4(b) presents the HR@5 of AMR under AIP attacks and
Table 5(b) presents the mean average hit rate changes. Although
AMR increases the general performance by including adversarial in-
formation into training process, the HR@5 jumps noticeably when
AIP attacks are applied, which means AMR is vulnerable to AIP
attacks. Our finding here is consistent with recent research in the
machine learning community [6, 44], which shows that achieving
adversarial robustness is non-trivial.
7.2 Defense by Image Compression
In the computer vision literature, simple defenses have been shown
to be effective against adversarial images that cause neural classi-
fiers to misclassify [10, 14, 19, 47]. Here, we evaluated two common
defenses: JPEG compression and bit depth reduction in order to test
whether they are effective against AIP attacks. These are known to
be able to erase the effect of image perturbations. We carried out
an evaluation by applying progressively stronger versions of the
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Table 6: Average HR@5 of a subset of 100 adversarial cold test items by INSA/EXPA with different magnitude of ϵ in DVBPR
and VBPR for Amazon Men’s Clothing and Tradesy.com data set. (cf. Figure 3 for adversarial item images with different ϵ)
Amazon Men Tradesy.com
Attack Cooperative cold ϵ = 4 ϵ = 8 ϵ = 16 ϵ = 32 Cooperative cold ϵ = 4 ϵ = 8 ϵ = 16 ϵ = 32
AlexRank INSA 0.0023 0.7856 0.8180 0.8258 0.8297 0.0054 0.9280 0.9351 0.9381 0.9400EXPA 0.0036 0.0035 0.0036 0.0036 0.0020 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
VBPR INSA 0.0018 0.2932 0.3159 0.3498 0.3599 0.0025 0.0734 0.0755 0.0815 0.0842EXPA 0.0008 0.0075 0.0135 0.0167 0.0005 0.0009 0.0009 0.0009
DVBPR INSA 0.0007 0.0049 0.0391 0.3706 0.7039 0.0018 0.0015 0.0194 0.1116 0.2731EXPA 0.0021 0.0088 0.0313 0.0554 0.0025 0.0076 0.0291 0.0397
Table 7: |∆HR@5 | before and after TAaMR attack: Cold items (attack is successful if HR@5 rises) and ordinary test items (suc-
cessful attacks cause a drop in HR@5) .
Amazon Men Tradesy.com
AlexRank VBPR DVBPR AlexRank VBPR DVBPR
Integrity FGSM adversarial cold vs. cooperative cold ↓ 0.0010 ↑ 0.0014 ↑ 0.0070 ↓ 0.0002 ↑ 0.0183 ↓ 0.0008
dimension PGD20 adversarial cold vs. cooperative cold ↑ 0.0100 ↓ 0.0011 ↓ 0.0005 ↑ 0.0019 ↓ 0.0014 ↓ 0.0004
Availability FGSM ordinary test vs. ordinary test ↑<< 0.0001 ↓<< 0.0001 ↑ 0.0016 ↓<< 0.0001 ↓<< 0.0001 ↑<< 0.0001
dimension PGD20 ordinary test vs. ordinary test ↓<< 0.0001 ↑<< 0.0001 ↑ 0.0016 ↑<< 0.0001 ↓<< 0.0001 ↑<< 0.0001
Table 8: Visualization of the level at which a defense is suc-
cessful at lowering the HR@5 of an adversarial cold item
equal or less the average HR@5 of a cooperative cold item.
For JPEG compression, levels are specified as compression
percents and for bit depth reduction levels are specified as
number of bits with which the image is encoded. (▲: Ama-
zon.com;⋆: Tradesy.com)
JPEG compression Bit depth reduction
90 70 50 30 10 7 6 5 4 3 2
AlexRank INSAEXPA ▲
VBPR INSAEXPA ▲⋆ ▲⋆
DVBPR INSA ⋆EXPA ▲ ▲⋆
defense to the 100-item subset of our larger test set that was previ-
ously selected. We do not evaluate SEMA, since the semantic attack
does not involve perturbations and if these defenses would destroy
the effectiveness of SEMA they would destroy the usefulness of all
images to the recommender system.
In Table 8, we visualize the level of strength of defense that
must be applied to the adversarial image in order for its rank to
be lowered to the average HR@5 of a cooperative image. If the
defenses presented effective protection against adversarial item
images then we would expect the ▲ and⋆ to appear consistently
to the far left in the boxes. This is clearly not the case. We see in
Table 8 that INSA is more difficult to defeat than EXPA, which is
expected because it leverages insider knowledge. However, EXPA
is clearly not easy to beat across the board. It is important to note
that this test is a strong one. If these defenses would be applied in
practice, they would need to be applied to all images and not just
adversarial images. Image content becomes indistinguishable as
compression increases, and an image 10% the size of the original
image or encoded with only 2-3 bits can be expected to contain
little to no item information.
8 CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
This paper has investigated the vulnerability at the core of Top-
N recommenders that use images to address cold start. We have
shown that Adversarial Item Promotion (AIP) attacks allow un-
scrupulous merchants to artificially raise the rank of their products
when a visually-aware recommender system is used for candidate
ranking. Our investigation has led us to conclude that AIP attacks
are a potential threat with clear practical implications. Compared
with existing profile injection attacks [5, 27, 33, 35] and poisoning
attacks [9, 15, 16, 29, 42] that promote items by injecting fake pro-
files, AIP only needs to modify the descriptive image of the item.
Effective AIP attacks are easy to mount, as demonstrated by the
minimal scale attack that we have studied here (cf. attack model in
Section 3.1). In short, our work reveals that the promise of hybrid
recommender systems to provide a higher degree of robustness [33]
is not an absolute, and that we must proceed with caution when
using images to address cold start.
Future work should dive more deeply into connection between
adversarial items and user experience with the recommender sys-
tem. One aspect is the relevance of adversarial items to users. Like
any cold start item, users click an adversarial cold start item because
it piques their interest. As an adversarial item accumulates more
clicks, and enters more users’ personalized lists, the main issue
may be not be relevance, but rather fair competition with other
potentially relevant items.
Another aspect related to user experience is the impact of image
quality. If users have sensitivities that cause them to avoid products
with images affected by perturbations, then attackers would need
to back off to weaker attacks that make perturbations unnoticeable.
In this case, defenses such as adversarial training could be more
effective. More work is needed to understand approaches such as
SEMA, which do not involve trading off image quality and attack
strength. Alternatively, approaches that make adversarial images
effective yet non-suspicious, such as [22, 48], can also be studied.
Future work must develop effective defenses against AIP attacks.
An approach that easily comes to mind is the use a gatekeeper
classifier to flag adversarial images at the moment that merchants
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upload them. It is clear that for SEMA such a classifier would be
difficult to build, since SEMA attacks are created in a natural manner
and are indistinguishable from cooperative images. For INSA and
EXPA, a gateway filter could be built if the exact specifications of the
adversarial attack, including the parameter settings, were known.
However, we need to be aware that in the worst case scenario
where the information of the gatekeeper is available (i.e., white-
box scenario), variants on INSA and EXPA can still bypass such a
classifier by constructing new loss functions [7].
We have shown in our paper (cf. Section 7.1) that simply incorpo-
rating on-the-fly adversarial information intomodel training cannot
guarantee a robust recommender. In addition, adversarial training
requires strict hypothesis about the attack strength (ϵ) [31], and it
also needs vast computational resources in practice [46]. Therefore,
building a robust visually-aware recommender system is non-trivial
and needs more research attention.
Future work must look at the impact of multipliers. If a single
item has multiple descriptive images, attacks are more likely to go
unnoticed, in particular semantic attacks that require no perturba-
tions. Further, multiple merchants (or fake merchant profiles) could
collaborate in a collusion attack. Finally, we note that although,
here, we have focused on e-commerce, entertainment recommender
systems are vulnerable: an adversarial signal could be embedded
into a thumbnail or the content itself. In sum, AIP attacks consti-
tute an important, practical risk of using images in recommender
systems and serious challenges remain to be addressed.
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